We study the political economy of instrument choice with an application to agricultural and food policies. We present stylized facts on the choice of policy instruments and develop a political economy theory of instrument choice. The key predictions of the model suggest a rational explanation of instrument choice patterns, based on the trade-off between transaction costs and distortions of the policies, and internal and external political constraints. Our empirical analysis supports the main predictions of the theoretical model. The shift from distortionary to less distortionary instruments is positively influenced by institutional development, a country's net trade status, and the GATT/WTO framework.
should be why governments have introduced so many market distortions through agricultural policies. The distortionary effects of government interventions are equally dependent on the choice of the instrument as on the level of the intervention. Therefore the choice of instrument should be at least of equal concern as the intervention level. In fact, both the trade and agricultural policy literature and the policy debates have reflected this importance (see e. g. Anderson and James, 2002; Gardner 1983 ). In the policy world, the debate on the choice of instruments has been a very important element of policy discussions. The differences in distortionary effects is recognized by the WTO in the classification of agricultural policy instruments in green, blue and amber boxes -with the green box for non-trade distorting policies instruments. This distinction between the level of support and the extent of market and trade distortions is at the heart of some important policy reforms, such as those of the EU's Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) over the past two decades. In fact, one could argue that the issue of instrument choice was the key element of the CAP reform, more so than the level of support (Swinnen, 2008) . Surprisingly, this attention to instrument choice in the literature and the policy debate has not translated in similar attention in studies on the political economy of agricultural and food policies where most of the focus has been on explaining the level of intervention rather than its form. A possible explanation for this bias in focus is differences in the availability of good empirical data, resulting in some well-known and puzzling stylized facts on policy level but not on instruments.
1 1 This argument may apply more widely, while there have been some studies in the general literature on explaining instrument choice, in particular why governments chose inefficient policies to redistribute income or protect certain groups (e.g. Cassing and Hillman, 1985; Rodrik, 1986; Coate and Morris, 1995; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2001) , these studies are almost exclusively theoretical. Only recently have there been a few empirical studies on the determinants of instrument choice, including Kono (2006) and Ederington and Minier (2006) . This paper is the first to present such stylized facts, partially drawing on OECD data. The paper then proceeds to provide an explanation of these stylized facts.
The paper is organized as follows. We first review related literature. Next we present stylized facts on instrument choice in agricultural and food policies. Then we develop a theoretical model and derive some key hypotheses. Afterwards we empirically test these hypotheses using an econometric study. The final section concludes.
Instrument Choice in Agricultural Policy
We first present some stylized facts on agricultural and food policy instrument choice in OECD countries over the past 25 years.
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Since 1986 the OECD calculates policy support given to agriculture. The total amount of support to agriculture is referred to as Producer Support Estimate (PSE). 3 The PSE data cover 28 countries, 12 of which are not OECD members, over the period . The OECD's calculation of policy support distinguishes between several instruments (see Table 1 ). For the purpose of our analysis it is convenient to combine the instruments into 'market price support' (mps), 'input subsidies' (is) and 'direct payments' (dp). Their share in total support (PSE) is represented by mpsh, ish, and dpsh, respectively.
The first instrument, mps, includes all transfers through tariffs, price support and subsidies directly linked to agricultural production. These instruments are typically considered as being the most distortive. The second instrument, is, are input subsidies and cover a very heterogeneous set of measures, spanning from investment aids and labor subsidies to land protection programs. Finally, the third instrument, dp, includes fully decoupled and partially decoupled agricultural payments. These instruments are generally considered the least distortive.
In the 1980s, the most important instrument was mps. The share of market price support in total support was 82%, whereas direct payments made up only 10%, and inputs subsidies 8%. In the next two decades the share of market price support has declined and that of direct payments increased substantially (Figure 1 ). By the late 2000s the former had decreased to 49% and the later increased to 61%. In contrast, the share of input subsidies remained about the same.
The choice of instrument is correlated with (a) the level of development; (b) the trade status, and (c) the URAA GATT agreement. Figure 2 illustrates a positive empirical correlation between economic development and the use of direct payments and Errore.
L'origine riferimento non è stata trovata.3 shows a negative correlation with the export share.
In addition, Figure 1 indicates that the shift from market price support to direct payments started in the early 1990s, which was the time of the conclusion of the URAA and has continued during the Doha WTO negotiations. GATT/WTO regulations distinguish between instruments according to their distortionary impact and limit the use of distorting measures while non-distorting measures are not regulated. More specifically, the WTO classifies agricultural policy instruments in green, blue and amber boxes -with the green box for non-trade distorting policies instruments (see Josling and Tangermann, 1999; Tangermann, 1999; Josling, 2000 for more details).
In summary, these empirical indications suggest that the choice of instruments is non-random. As stylized facts, we find that the choice of instruments is correlated with three factors: (a) a country's level of development; (b) the URAA GATT agreement and the Doha WTO negotiations; and (c) a country's trade status. We now develop a theoretical model to explain these stylized observations.
Theory
We use the same static framework as most models in the literature and consider the choice of governments between instruments in the absence of existing policies (see, e.g., Hillman and Ursprung, 1988; Foster and Rausser, 1993; Kono, 2006) . We assume that governments have perfect information on the impact of the various policy instruments, so there is no room for policy obfuscation. Consider that for some reason, e.g. a dramatic decline in world market prices for agricultural products, the government introduces policies to support producers' incomes.
We assume that the government has two different policy instruments at its disposal (see e.g. Hillman and Ursprung, 1988; Rodrik, 1986; Coate and Morris, 1995) Policy t has low transaction costs but high costs of market distortions, and has a positive (negative) impact on government revenue if the country is a net importer (exporter).
Policy s causes fewer distortions but is characterized by high transaction costs, and has a strongly negative impact on government revenue, independent of the country's trade status. Even if the country is a net exporter, the impact of instrument s on government revenue is more negative than instrument t 's impact. One could think of tariffs vis-à-vis lump-sum transfers, or market price support vis-à-vis direct income support as examples of policies t and s , respectively.
As in Kono (2006) , we assume that governments need both voter support and money to stay in power. Money can be raised both through interest-group contributions and through revenues from the implementation of policy instruments. Our assumptions imply a modified Grossman and Helpman (1994) model of government decision-making where, in line with Maggi and Rodríguez-Clare (2000) , the government maximizes a weighted sum of interest group contributions, policy revenues, and total voter support:
where G is government utility, C are the interest-group contributions, R measures the budgetary costs or revenues of the policy instruments, and V is total voter support. t and s are the income transfers of the two policy instruments, and and V ω are the weights that the government gives to respectively revenue considerations and total voter support. β represents the trade balance of that country, and α is an inverse measure for a country's institutional development. In developing countries -with relatively underdeveloped institutions -raising revenue through foreign trade taxes constitutes the single largest source of public revenue (Burgess and Stern, 1993; Rodrik, 1995; Bates and Block, 2010) . The revenue motive is therefore more imperative in countries with less developed institutions. Since α inversely measures the country's institutional development, we assume that the weight attached by the government to the revenue function increases with less developed institutions 0
As in Grossman and Helpman (1994) , we assume that the interest group consists of active lobbyists that solicit income transfers from the government. 
The policy revenue function ( ) , ; R t s β is assumed to be decreasing in policy instrument s ( ) 0 s R < , whereas the revenue impact of instrument t can be either positive 
The function for total voter support, ( )
where the first term, ( ) , W t s , represents total voter welfare, and the second and third terms, α , measure the total transaction costs related to each instrument. As before, α is an inverse measure for the country's institutional development. In an unfavourable institutional environment where institutions are underdeveloped and the administrative capacity is low, transaction costs are higher for the same amount of income transfer (Burgess and Stern, 1993 Winston, 2004) . To secure uniqueness of the equilibrium and reaction function stability, in line with Brander and Spencer (1983) and Dixit (1984) , we assume that the own effects of the income transfers on marginal contributions, revenue, and total voter welfare exceed cross effects such that tt st G G < Result 2:
Proof: See Appendix.
Result 2 implies that if the trade balance of a country increases ( β increases), the relative share of the more distorting policy in the total income transfer decreases ( * h decreases).
For example, if for some exogenous reason a country's imports decrease, ceteris paribus, the country will shift to using the less distorting policy relatively more, although it involves relatively higher transaction costs.
Empirical Analysis
To formally test whether our theoretical hypotheses are consistent with the observed evidence on instrument choices we use the share of market price support in total support (mpsh) as a proxy for the instrument t and the share of direct payments in total support (dpsh) as a proxy for the instrument s. As we explained in section 2, the OECD data on instrument choice cover 28 countries over the 1986-2009 period. 6 We proxy the institutional development and administrative capacity of a country by real GDP per capita (gdppc), taken from the World Development Indicators (World Bank). As an indicator of the trade status we use the net export share in total production (exsh), based on FAO data. 7 To capture the effect of international agreement, we include a dummy variable, d_gatt. This dummy takes the value of 1 since 1995 (0 otherwise).
1995 was the first year of the GATT Agreement implementation, which has introduced more constraints on the use of highly distortionary policy instruments like mps, than on lower distortionary instruments, like dp. In fact, fully decoupled policies which are not trade distorting are allowed under WTO principles.
As control variable and to account for path dependency and the persistence of policies, we include the level of the dependent variable in the previous period.
Finally, one may argue that from a conceptual point of view, the empirical model should also include the level of support (PSE gdppc has a significant negative effect on mpsh, the share of market price support, and gdppc a significant positive effect on dpsh, the share of direct income support. These results are consistent with our theoretical argument that countries with lower administrative capacity and lower institutional development have a preference for price support. Also in line with our hypothesis, the net export share has a significant negative effect on mpsh, and a positive and significant effect on dpsh.
The 1994 GATT Agreement as captured by the dummy d_gatt is significantly negatively correlated with mpsh, and positively with dpsh. These results are consistent with the argument that the GATT constraints exert an effect on instrument choices: mpsh declined on average after the implementation of the 1994 GATT agreement, and dpsh increased.
In all regressions the coefficients of the lagged value of the dependent variable are positive and strongly significant. The magnitude of the lagged coefficients, ranging from 0.66 to 0.86, confirm a strong level of persistency in instrument choice.
Robustness Tests
We performed a series of additional robustness test. First, a potential problem in applying OLS to our specification is that the lagged dependent variable can be endogenous to the fixed effects in the error term, which gives the well know dynamic panel bias (see, e.g., Roodman, 2009) . A first step to deal with this is by removing the fixed effects from the error term, running the standard Least Square with Dummy Variables (LSDV) estimator.
In doing so, we also control for any unobserved heterogeneity that are correlated with our explanatory variables.
The LSDV regression results show that the fixed effects are jointly significant suggesting that their inclusion is correct. As expected, the estimated coefficients of the lagged dependent variable are lower in magnitude, but still strongly significant and have their expected signs. The effect of the trade status is estimated with less precision.
A potential problem with LSDV is that this dynamic panel estimator may be biased, when applied to a panel structure where the year dimension, T, is lower than the number of individual (countries) N, due to the endogeneity of the lagged dependent variable. To address this potential source of bias, the system GMM estimator proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998) Arellano-Bond AR(1) and AR (2) tests, indicate the presence of first order serial correlation, but no second order serial correlation, suggesting that the model dynamic is correctly specified. Moreover, the standard Hansen test confirms that in all cases our set of instruments is valid. The values are averages for the periods. The policy instruments considered are based on the following items of the PSE database: 'market price support' refers to support based on commodity outputs (items A1 and A2, of the PSE database); 'input subsidies' is the sum of payments based on input use and miscellaneous payments (items B and G); 'direct payments' refer to different payments decoupled or partially decoupled from production (items from C to F).
Source: own computation based on OECD PSE/CSE database (2010). 
